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Prospects and Programs for Fertility Reduction, 1990 Reduction, -2015 W. Parker Mauldin and John A. Ross What is the likelihood that each of the 37 developing countries with populations of 15 million or more in 1990 will reach replacementfertility by the year 2015? These countries have a combined population of 3.9 billion, 91 percent of the population of all developing countries. For this article, a composite index was used as the basisfor predictingfuture levels of totalfertility. The index was constructedfrom socioeconomic variables (life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rates, percent adult literacy, ratio of children enrolled in primary or secondary school, percent of the laborforce in nonagricultural occupations, gross national product per capita, and percent of the population living in urban areas), totalfertility ratesfor the years 1985-90, totalfertility rate declinefrom 1960-65 to 1985-90,family planning program effort scores in 1989, and the level of contraceptive prevalence in 1990. Eight countries are classified as certain to reach replacementfertility by 2015, and an additional thirteen probably will also. Five countries are classified as possibly reaching replacement fertility, and eleven as unlikely to do so. (STUDIES IN FAMILY PLANNING 1994: 25, 2: 77-95 ) In this article, the likelihood is assessed that each of the 37 developing countries with populations of 15 million or more in 1990 will reach replacement fertility by 2015, less than a quarter century from now. These countries have a combined population of 3.9 billion, 91 percent of the population of all developing countries. In addition, Bernard Berelson's 1978 assessment of which countries would reach a crude birth rate (CBR) of 20 births per year per 1,000 population, roughly a total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.5 births per woman by the year 2000, is reviewed (Berelson, 1978) . Finally, projections of past trends are compared with the medium projections of the United Nations as assessed in 1992.
Berelson began with 35 countries that had a population of 10 million or more in 1975. However, he excluded six of these because of local political situations-Vietnam, Burma, North Korea, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Iraq. In gauging future fertility declines, he took into account the then current (around 1975) natively, from 1965 to 1975) . He also used the social setting of each country-an index composed of life expectancy, infant mortality rate (IMR), adult literacy, school enrollment, percent of the labor force that is nonagricultural, and percent of never-married females aged 15-19. A similar indicator is used here, as explained below (see Appendix I).
Berelson's final classification placed countries into four groups, for their likelihood of reaching a CBR of 20 by the year 2000: (1) The Certain: Taiwan, South Korea, and Chile; (2) The Probable: China, Brazil, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Colombia, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, and Malaysia; (3) The Possible: India, Indonesia, Egypt, and Peru; and (4) The Unlikely: Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria, Iran, Zaire, Afghanistan, Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tanzania, Kenya, and Nepal.
In the Certain group, Taiwan and South Korea are already below the target level. Chile's TFR has fallen from 5.23 children per woman to 2.7 and, if its rate of change continues, will reach 2.5 by 1995. In the Probable group, China and Thailand have TFRs at or near replacement level and their CBRs are already about 20 or below. Sri Lanka has a CBR in the low 20s and is likely to meet Berelson's target before the end of the decade. The other countries in this category are unlikely to have a TFR as low as 2.5 or a CBR as low as 20 by the year 2000. In the Possible and Unlikely groups, none of the countries is likely to have a CBR as low as 20 by the year 2000.
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Recent Trends in Indicators Socioeconomic Trends
Changes in key social and economic indicators for the developing world as a whole during the 25 years from 1960 to 1985 have been large,' as is shown in Table 1 . The major differences in the two sets of figures (for all 37 countries and for all countries except China and India) are the appreciably smaller decline in TFR with China and India excluded (the difference being mainly due to China's rapid decline in fertility), the slower growth in gross national product (GNP) per capita (again due to China's rapid increase in GNP per capita), the smaller decrease in infant mortality and life expectancy, and a larger increase in males in the nonagricultural labor force. Data on female literacy are not available for China for 1960 or 1965. With India excluded, female literacy is higher both in 1965 and 1990 , but the increase in female adult literacy during the 25-year period is about the same whether India is included or excluded.
Both sets of figures, with and without China and India, show increases of about 20 percentage points in adult literacy (with slightly higher increases for females), increases of 33 and 27 points, respectively, in the primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios, and modest increases in the proportion of the population living in urban areas. The levels of each of these indicators are far from satisfactory, but improvements have been substantial.
Contraceptive Prevalence Trends
Several influences have led to the increase in contraceptive prevalence from about 15 percent in 1965 to more than 50 percent today (not shown). These include improvements in social and economic indicators, in contraceptive technology, in the adoption of population policies designed to make contraceptives available to couples who want them, and in the implementation of family planning programs. The practice of contraception has been the major means of reducing fertility, although both a rise in the age of marriage and resort to abortion have played a part.
Program Effort Trends
In three assessments, for the years 1972, 1982, and 1989 , input measures for family planning programs showed systematic improvement across the board, in every region and in each of four dimensions of program effort. Family planning programs have been weakest in subSaharan Africa, with the region as a whole having scores (unit weights) of 5 percent of maximum in 1972, 16 percent in 1982, and 36 percent in 1989 . While most people live in countries with the stronger programs, most individual programs are scored as "weak"; nevertheless there have been significant improvements, particularly during the 1980s.
Fertility Trends
As is now well known, the TFR for the developing world as a whole fell by one-third between the early 1960s and the late 1980s. This is equivalent to a fall of one-half toward the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman, a truly historic transformation of reproductive behavior. With China omitted, the fall is less (on a populationweighted basis), a decline of 1.7 children per woman from 6.2, or a decline of just above 40 percent toward replacement level. Sub-Saharan Africa is an important exception. Fertility has not declined, and there has not been an increase in GNP per capita. A few exceptions to this generalization are: Fertility has begun to decline in Botswana, Kenya, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and possibly in Lesotho. However, these declines have not been sufficiently large to affect the regional average appreciably. Nevertheless, almost all agency projections assume the beginning of fertility decline in sub-Saharan Africa in this decade. A supporting rationale for this assumption can be found in the past improvements in life expectancy, infant mortality rates, adult literacy, and school enrollment ratios, and a shift toward nonagricultural employment (although two-thirds of males in the labor force are still in agriculture). There are faint and uncertain signs that contraceptive prevalence has begun to creep upward, but it is still at a low level, again excepting Botswana (33 percent), Kenya (33 percent), South Africa (56 percent), and Zimbabwe (43 percent). There are harbingers of change in Zambia, where 15 percent of married women of reproductive age were practicing contraception in 1992.
Africa aside, we assume that, despite increasing ethnic conflicts, improvements will continue to be made in most socioeconomic indicators in most of the regions of the world, that family planning programs will become a little stronger in the future, and that contraceptive prevalence will continue to rise, although not quite as rapidly as during the last two decades. The combination of these factors, together with the less tangible but important forces of general modernization, including ideational changes, will lead to further declines in fertility.
New Estimates for Prospects of Fertility Decline
The predictions given below cannot of course take account of extraordinary or cataclysmic events that no one can foresee. They have occurred throughout history and may occur again, but an exercise like this one must be grounded in the more general and pervasive forces that are ongoing and will clearly persist. Unanticipated events like the collapse of the Soviet empire, or the near total breakdown of social order in a Zaire or Somalia, cannot be worked into a calculus of demographic predictions (McNicoll, 1992a and 1992b) .
The 37 countries with populations of 15 million or more in 1990 have, as noted, a total population of 3.9 billion today, or 91 percent of the population of the countries designated by the United Nations as less developed countries (LDC). Those countries are listed in Table 2 with their 1993 populations. The question addressed here is which of these countries are likely to have total fertility rates at or near (or below) replacement by the year 2015.
Methodology A country's prospects for substantial fertility decline can be judged according to a variety of indicators. In this analysis, we have relied principally upon the following six: (1) socioeconomic setting (SES); (2) total fertility rate; (3) total fertility rate decline; (4) contraceptive prevalence; (5) program effort score; and (6) composite index.
To merge these indicators into a single composite index, each country was located within the observed range of variation of each indicator. That range was then adjusted to go from zero to one hundred, so that a country 
at the top of the range for all five indicators would score 100 on each, and 100 on the resulting index, since that is a simple average of the five ranks. The index was recalculated in various ways and was found to be robust against different assumptions, such as giving different weights to the five indicators, or omitting one indicator. Such variations made only trivial differences in the ranking of the 37 countries; the country positions were essentially undisturbed. Therefore, the simplest version is used here, giving equal weights to all five indicators (see Appendix II). The close interrelationships among the indicators and the composite index appear in the following correlation matrix of (R2 values). The composite index closely follows the TFR, the TFR decline, and the contraceptive prevalence level. It correlates well with the SES indicator, and appreciably so with the program effort score. The five indicators themselves are only moderately intercorrelated, ranging from 0.59 to 0.04, except that contraceptive prevalence and TFR, and TFR decline, are highly correlated (as one would expect). A case can be made for deleting either contraceptive prevalence or TFR 1985-90. But the counter case is that numerous countries deviate from the regression line of the two by more than one child. The degree of deviation from the regression line led us to include both variables.
Fertility clearly responds to contraceptive prevalence (R2=.89). As noted, both underwent transformations between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, and the relationship between the two is strong both cross-sectionally and over time. A regression on 95 countries using data available from the Population Council Databank as of February 1993 gives the relation TFR = 7.3142 -(0.0704) X percent prevalence (R2 is 0.89), implying a fall of one birth for each 14-point rise in prevalence.
From this formula, contraceptive prevalence of 74 percent leads to replacement fertility, at a TFR of 2.1. This relationship would, of course, change if there were a significant change in the frequency of induced abortion, in the use of "morning after" pills, or in the average useeffectiveness of contraceptives.
Results
The 37 countries range from 13 to 85 on the composite index. Table 3 gives values for each of the five indicators, as well as the resulting value on the composite index. The countries are listed from high to low on the index and are divided into quartiles of the range for the four prospect groups: Certain, Probable, Possible, and Unlikely. The highly regular differences across the four groups are shown in Figure 1 .
Regional patterns are given in Table 4 . Interestingly, within Asia there is considerable spread of countries across the four prospect groups; however, East Asian countries are concentrated in the Certain category, whereas Southeast and South Asian ones appear in the other three. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa have the least spread, but the Latin American countries are clustered in the two most favorable categories, while the African ones are nearly all in the least favorable one. The Middle Eastern and North African countries are evenly dispersed across the lower three categories. Thus regional patterns differ greatly, both in spread and central tendency. Detailed statistical information for each country as of 1985 is given in Table 5 .
The Certain Group Asia The Asian countries in this group are China, the two Koreas, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand. South Korea and Taiwan have below-replacement fertility levels, and China and Thailand are at or near the replacement level. Each of these countries has had rapid rates of increase in GNP per capita and life expectancy, and rapid decreases in infant mortality. Both male and female literacy rates are high. Only Thailand has a relatively low enrollment ratio in primary and secondary schools (59 percent). Also, each of these countries has had a strong family planning program: for South Korea and Taiwan, there is little need for continuation of such strong programs in the future; in fact, both governments have reduced their budgets for them.
Life expectancy is about 70 in nearly all of these countries, and infant mortality rates are relatively low. The rate of increase in GNP per capita (not shown) has been uniformly good (although relevant data are not available for North Korea). Literacy and primary plus secondary school enrollment rates are high, and TFR declines (see Table 3 ) have been dramatic, with the smallest decline occurring from 1960-65 to 1985-90 at 2.5 births per woman. Family planning programs have been well organized and strong, except in North Korea where less is known of the program. The program effort rating (also shown in Table 3 ) gives the country a score of 54, which is at the borderline between "weak" and "moderate." Unless there is a dramatic slowing in the rate of fertility decline, each of these countries will reach replacement fertility by 2005 or earlier.
A rapid change in GNP per capita has occurred in China during the past three decades, although income per capita is still estimated at the low level of US$370. Overall, "marked improvements in health, education, and, to a certain extent, the status of women altered childbearing aspirations in ways that facilitated fertility decline once modern means of contraception were made available by the birth planning program." (Greenhalgh and Hull, 1992: 20-22) Favorable factors for low fertility include a strong family planning program throughout the country, high life expectancy (70 years), low infant mortality (30 deaths per 1,000 live births), and a high enrollment ratio in primary and secondary schools (88 percent). Less positive factors include the low GNP per capita, moderately high illiteracy (32 percent), and a lag in literacy and school enrollment for females. Some uncertainty exists as to the trend in and level of fertility in China. Data calculated from the birth histories collected in the 1988 two-per-thousand survey conducted by the State Commission on Family Planning showed a continuing decline in the TFR to 2.1 births per woman in 1985, but a rise to 2.26 in 1987. Calculations from the 1990 census give a higher rate of 2.32 for 1985, an increase in the TFR in 1987 TFR in , and decreases in 1988 TFR in , 1989 TFR in , and 1990 to 2.18. The Department of Planning and Statistics of the State Family Planning Commission has published data on fertility and contraceptive prevalence for the period 1988 to 1991, which indicate that fertility has fallen, with the crude birth rate below 20 and the TFR down from 2.52 in 1988 to 2.07 in 1991. The accuracy of these figures is questionable. In a speech given at a press conference on 21 April 1993, Minister Peng Peiyun said, "According to our experiences, the fertility rate from a sampling survey made recently is lower than the actual rate, which shows that the actual fertility rate may be higher than the outcome of the survey." To be sure, there are strong pressures in China to avoid unplanned births, but there are also strong pressures to underreport births.
The situation in China is complex, and the future is uncertain. Major changes in the leadership of China will occur in the near future when the aged figures now dominant are gone from the scene. The thrust toward a mar- ket economy during the last several years has been accompanied by a loosening of central authority, both in general and with reference to the family planning program; consequently there is uncertainty about future fertility declines. If the economy continues to grow and if the central authorities retain their strong hold on the society, fertility will most probably continue to stand at or below replacement level from now until 2015. It is equally plausible that with a continuing liberalization of the economy, rural fertility will increase and be in the range of 2.5-3.0 births per woman (Feeney, 1992; Feeney et al., 1992) .
Latin America Colombia and Mexico fall into the Certain group in Latin America. Life expectancy at birth has increased by 12 years in Colombia and Mexico during the past three decades and is approaching 70 years. Income per capita is $700 in Colombia and more than $950 in Mexico. Growth in income has been above 2 percent per year in both counVolume 25 Number 2 March/April 83 tries. Literacy is high at 87 percent, and primary plus secondary school enrollment is about 80 percent.
Fertility has fallen dramatically in each of these countries, decreasing by 3.15 births in Mexico and 3.86 in Colombia. Contraceptive prevalence is 66 percent in Colombia and 53 percent in Mexico. Unless there is a sharp attenuation of the rates of decline in fertility, each of these countries will reach replacement fertility by the end of this century.
The Probable Group Asia The Asian countries in this group are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The Indian subcontinent contains more than one billion people, separated into four nations: India (897 million), Pakistan (128) Bangladesh (122), and Nepal (21). Each of these countries has a record of poverty, low literacy, high mortality, low life expectancy, and low income per capita. Bangladesh and India have adopted policies to reduce their rates of growth and have developed strong family planning programs. Although India was the first country in the world to articulate a policy to reduce its rate of population growth, it has often been criticized for what has been perceived as weak implementation of its program. It has also been criticized for its heavy focus on sterilization. We see India's program in a somewhat more favorable light. Contraceptive prevalence increased from 14 percent in 1970 to 34 percent in 1980 and to 43 percent in 1988, an average increase of 1.6 percentage points per year. The social and economic setting of which the program is a part is, however, daunting-low income per capita ($350), low annual rate of increase in GNP per capita from 1960 to 1990 (1.9 percent per year), relatively low life expectancy (58), high infant mortality (98 deaths per 1,000 live births), low literacy (48 percent), particularly among women (34 percent), and low female enrollment in primary and secondary schools (55 percent).
Despite these unfavorable social and economic indicators, the TFR has gradually fallen from about 5.8 in 1960 to 4.2, a decrease of more than 25 percent. If that pace of decline were to be continued until 2015, the TFR would be just under 2.5. Increased emphasis has been placed on the availability of a larger number of effective contraceptive methods and less on sterilization. The Government of India has identified 90 districts with high fertility, mostly in the four large northern states of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajastan, and Uttar Pradesh (together containing 336 million persons in 1991), and it will provide a larger proportion of its resources to these districts.
A steady though unspectacular improvement in social and economic factors has been made. If the pace of those changes should increase, and if the family planning program continues to improve, India may possibly achieve replacement fertility by 2015.
Indonesia ranks higher than India on each of the socioeconomic indices discussed here. Between 1960 and 1990, life expectancy rose by 20 years to 61. Its IMR is still high at 70, but has been cut in half during the last three decades. Adult literacy increased from 39 to 77 percent from 1960 to 1990, and enrollment ratios of primary and secondary school increased slightly more. Women's literacy increased from 26 to 68 percent during the same period.
Indonesia has a strong family planning program, and contraceptive prevalence increased from 9 percent in 1973 to 50 percent in 1991, a high average annual increase of 2.28 percentage points a year. The TFR decreased by almost two births per woman (1.94) from 1960 to 1990, more than halfway toward replacement from its level of 5.42 in 1960.
Malaysia's economy has grown at an average annual rate of 4 percent for three decades and its GNP per capita is more than $2,300. Literacy is relatively high at 78 percent, and the enrollment ratio of primary plus secondary school is almost as high. Life expectancy is 70 years, and the IMR is low-16 deaths per 1,000 live births. Contraceptive prevalence increased from 6 percent in 1966-67 to 51 percent in 1984, an average annual increase of 2.44 percentage points. One caution about classifving Malaysia as Certain rests on the government's attempt to slow the fall in the growth rate, as well as on the concern that ethnic rivalries will serve to keep fertility of the Malays relatively high.
The Philippines have had a slow rate of increase in income per capita, averaging 1.3 percent a year from 1960 to 1990, to a figure of $720 in 1990. Life expectancy at birth is about 63 years, and the infant mortality rate is 45. Adult literacy is 90 percent, and primary plus secondary school enrollment is 97 percent, with females ranking at least as high as males. The rate of natural increase has fallen from about 3 percent in 1960-65 to 2.5 percent.
"Over the course of its history the Philippines Family Planning Program has been characterized by vacillating political support, variable levels of financing from both domestic and external sources, diffused responsibility for Program function, and lack of consensus on Program goals. As a result, despite modest increases in contraceptive prevalence and declines in total fertility, the Philippines Program has not attained its own stated objectives nor achieved the results observed in neighboring countries." (World Bank, 1991: 1) There is uncertainty about trends in contraceptive prevalence and in the total fertility rate. A series of national surveys shows a drop in contraceptive prevalence from 38.5 percent in 1978 to 32.0 percent in 1983, and again from 45.8 percent in 1986 to 36.1 percent in 1988. Use of modern methods of contraception, excluding condoms, has increased in each successive survey, although the increase from 1986 to 1988 was only from 20.7 percent to 20.9 percent. The Government of the Philippines is again stressing the need for slowing population growth, and is emphasizing the importance of family planning. The 1992-93 National Demographic Survey reported contraceptive prevalence of 40 percent, and the use of modern methods at 24.9 percent. Total fertility rates declined from 6.29 in 1963 -67 to 5.28 in 1978 -82 (Casterline et al., 1988 ), and to 4.26 in 1983 -87 (World Bank, 1991 . The pace of decline, according to the various estimates, has been uneven, with small drops in the TFR from 1965 to 1970 and from 1975 to 1980 , but with large decreases from 1970 to 1975 and from 1980 to 1985 (Schmeding et al., 1992 . This decree formalized the guidelines and norms regarding age at marriage (22 years or older for women; 24 years or older for men living in urban areas and those employed by the government or in industry, others could marry at ages three years younger). It gave the norm for the number of children (not more than two for most people, except the ethnic minorities and others in special circumstances who could have three children) and birth spacing, for which three to five years was specified (UNFPA, no date: 27). The rate of population growth is to be reduced by obtaining an increase in the age of mothers at first birth, birth spacing of three to five years, and a family norm of one to two children, with exceptions made for special groups.
Vietnam has a strong family planning program, and in the 1988 national survey, contraceptive prevalence was estimated at 53 percent. The government's goal is to lower the annual population growth rate to below 1.8 percent by the year 2000 (UNFPA, no date). The Vietnamese people and government have sufficient vigor and determination that if we were basing our classification on intuition rather than on statistics, we would move Vietnam from the Probable to the Certain group.
Latin America For fertility decline, Argentina is a country stalled in time, and there is no assurance that this will change within the next few decades. Its TFR stayed very close to 3.0 from 1950-55 to 1985-90, and its crude birth rate has fallen by only 2 births per 1,000 population, from 25 in 1950-55 to 23 in 1985-90. Its rate of natural increase has decreased gradually, from 1.63 percent in the earlier period to 1.27 percent in 1985-90. Literacy has been at 95 percent or above during this period, and primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios have increased, from 73 percent in 1960 to 96 percent in 1990. Female literacy and enrollment ratios are slightly higher than those of males. Life expectancy at birth is 70 years, and the infant mortality rate is in the low 30s. However, Argentina's economy has been stagnant throughout this period, although its GNP per capita is relatively high at $2,555.
Venezuela is similar to Argentina in life expectancy, infant mortality, GNP per capita, high literacy, and a stagnant economy. Its primary plus secondary school enrollment ratio is somewhat lower than Argentina's (83 percent as compared with 96 percent). Also, Venezuela had a high total fertility rate in 1960, 6.46 as compared with Argentina's 3.09, but it has declined by three births per woman to 3.45.
Brazil and Peru have lower life expectancies, higher IMRs, and lower GNP per capita values than do Argentina and Venezuela. However, literacy is relatively high, and primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios are very high. Peru has had a stagnant economy throughout most of the past three decades, whereas Brazil has had rapid economic growth until recent years-from 1965 to 1990 its GNP per capita grew at an average of 3.3 percent per year (World Bank, 1992) . Brazil has experienced a substantial fertility decline even in the absence of any appreciable government program effort. The country is highly urbanized, with most males employed in nonagricultural pursuits, and it ranks at the top of the Probable group.
North Africa and the Middle East Egypt has had rapid economic growth, with GNP per capita increasing at an annual rate of 4.1 percent from 1965 to 1990. Life expectancy increased by 12 years during approximately the same period, and was estimated to be 59 years in the 1985-90 period. The infant mortalVolume 25 Number 2 March/April 85 ity rate is still moderately high at 65, but this represents a decrease of 110 points and more than 60 percent from 175 deaths for 1960-65. Adult literacy remains at a low level, 48 percent in 1990, and only 34 percent for females. Primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios have increased appreciably during the past 25 years; they were 81 percent for females and 90 percent for both sexes in 1990. Thus substantial improvement has been achieved for most social and economic indicators, although levels of several of these are far from satisfactory.
Egypt has had a policy to lower its rate of population growth since the early 1960s, although its family planning program was judged to be weak until the middle and late 1980s, when it was ranked at the lower boundary of the "strong" category. Contraceptive prevalence increased slowly from 25 percent in 1974-75 to 30 percent in 1984, and then more rapidly to 37 percent in 1988-89 and to 47 percent in 1992. These figures imply a modest increase in contraceptive prevalence of only 1.25 percentage points a year over the whole period, though it has been greater in recent years. A projection of contraceptive prevalence and expected TFRs to the year 2015 suggests that Egypt should be able to achieve replacement fertility by 2015.
Morocco's GNP per capita increased at an average annual rate of 2.3 percent from 1960 to 1990, and was $950 in 1990. Its life expectancy increased from 48 to about 61 years from 1960-65 to 1985-90, and its IMR decreased by 29 points to 58. Adult literacy increased rapidly, but from a low level of only 14 percent in 1960; its level in 1990 was still relatively low at 49 percent. Female literacy followed the same pattern, but at a much lower level; it increased from 6 to 38 percent. The pattern of primary plus secondary school enrollment was the same, but the female enrollment ratio was only 41 percent in 1990.
Morocco's family planning program was very weak in 1972, with a score of only 13, but it has increased steadily, to a score of 57 in 1989. Similarly, contraceptive prevalence rose from 20 percent in 1980 to 41.5 percent in 1992. Its TFR was 7.15 in 1960-65, but it has fallen by more than 40 percent, to 4.2 in 1992. Social and economic conditions, as well as the family planning program, have been improving steadily during the past three decades. Morocco has far to go on its social and economic indicators, but if these trends continue, it will reach replacement fertility a few years before 2015.
Turkey is the only country in the Middle East that is likely to reach replacement fertility by 2015. Its GNP per capita grew by an average of 2.6 percent per year during the period 1965 -90, to $1,630 (World Bank, 1992 Sub-Saharan Africa With a population of 38 million, South Africa is the third largest country in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria and Ethiopia rank first and second). Its GNP per capita is moderately high at $2,500, although its rate of increase in income was a modest 1.3 percent from 1965 to 1990. Life expectancy is 60 years, and infant mortality is 55. The crude birth rate decreased from the low 40s in 1960-65 to about 32 in 1985-90. During the same period, the total fertility rate declined from 6.51 to 4.48 according to the United Nations, and a national survey in 1987-89 reported a TFR of 4.58 among blacks, a decrease of more than 25 percent from 6.25 in 1970-75 (Freedman, 1992) . This is the lowest TFR among blacks of any country in sub-Saharan Africa.
South Africa has a very active family planning program. Freedman notes that private and family planning efforts going back to the 1960s were supplemented by the government in the early 1970s. A national family planning program was initiated in 1974 to provide services, information, and counseling free to all racial groups, with financing from the national government. Among current black users of contraceptives, 93 percent obtain their contraceptive supplies and services from family planning program facilities (see Mosteret and Du Plessis, 1990) . There are now about 3,796 clinics and 60,196 points of service.
The estimates of TFRs from the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) of South Africa are generally about the same as those of the United Nations (see Mosteret, 1990 Although social and economic factors in Bangladesh seem incompatible with low fertility, rapid increases have occurred in contraceptive prevalence as the result of both a strong national program and strong efforts of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). A continuation of past trends would lead to a sufficiently high level of contraceptive use to bring about replacement fertility by 2015. This result is not highly likely, but it is by no means impossible. Surprisingly, the available estimates for the key indicators place Myanmar in the Possible rather than the Unlikely group. Although its TFR declined by only 1.5 births per woman in the 25 years from 1960-65 to 1985-90, and its GNP per capita was only $190 in 1985, literacy was high at 81 percent in 1990, and the infant mortality rate decreased by more than a third from 150 in 1960-65 to 94 in 1985-90. GNP per capita increased by 2.4 percent per year from 1965 to 1985. Primary plus secondary school enrollment was relatively low at 61 percent in 1985, having increased from 50 percent in 1965. Although Myanmar is unlikely to achieve a TFR of 2.1 children per woman by 2015, we follow the results of our methodology here and leave it in the Possible group.
Algeria has had a modest rate of increase in its GNP per capita, of 2.1 percent per year, to an estimated $2,060 in 1990. Its life expectancy is in the mid-60s and its IMR is about 74. The rate of natural increase has decreased slightly, from 3.1 percent in 1960-65 to 2.7 percent in 1985-90. The crude death rate was cut in half during this period, and the crude birth rate declined by 15 points from 50 to 35. The TFR is still high, although it declined by almost two children per woman from 7.38 to 5.43 from 1960-65 to 1985-90 . Literacy remains at the low level of 57 percent for males and 45 percent for females. Major gains have been achieved in primary plus secondary school enrollment both for males and females during the past three decades, with female enrollment ratios at 72 percent in 1990.
Algeria's family planning efforts have been weak, but they improved from a score of 25 in 1982 to 46 in 1989. Contraceptive prevalence was 35.5 percent in 1986-87, the date of the latest national sample survey. Neither social and economic factors nor the strength of the family planning program are sufficiently favorable to expect replacement fertility within the next 25 years.
Iran has the potential of reducing fertility sharply and rapidly. It has a GNP per capita of $2,490, threefourths of its labor force is nonagricultural, life expectancy is 65 years, the infant mortality rate is relatively low at 52 deaths per 1,000 live births, and primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios are high at 90 percent for males and 75 percent for females. Adult literacy, however, is relatively low at about 43 percent for females and 65 for males. The United Nations estimates the TFR for 1985-90 as 6.5, a decrease of only three-quarters of a child from 1960-65, when it was 7.3. Recent visitors to Iran report that it has an active family planning program. However, fertility is high, and despite the oil wealth of the country, the religious fundamentalists in power are likely to resist modernization for many years to come.
Kenya has a relatively low life expectancy (58 years), high IMR (69), low GNP per capita ($370), and high fertility (a TFR of 6.8), even after the relatively recent drop in the rate of more than one child per woman. Adult literacy increased from 20 percent in 1960 to 69 percent in 1990, and the gross enrollment ratio in primary plus secondary schools increased from 29 percent to 72 percent during the same period. Kenya has greatly strengthened its family planning program, and contraceptive prevalence increased by 20 percentage points from 1977-78 to 1988-89, a relatively high average of 1.8 points of increase a year. If the political situation is stable, and if the pace of change during the past decades can be maintained, Kenya may be able to reduce its fertility to near-replacement level by 2015.
The Unlikely Group
Eleven countries with a combined population of 500 million are classified as having essentially no chance of Volume 25 Number 2 March/April 87 reaching replacement fertility by 2015. In regional groupings these are Afghanistan, Nepal, and Pakistan; Iraq and Sudan; Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. Based on past fertility trends, all of these countries are projected to have a TFR of 5 or more in 2015; three are projected to have TFRs of 7 or more, six to have TFRs of 6 to 7, and two to have TFRs of 5 to 6. Two countries, Pakistan and Nigeria, are among the largest seven developing countries, and are low on nearly every indicator. Both have taken steps to strengthen their action programs to address rapid growth, but neither has extended services effectively to the rural population.
Average values for SES factors are low for this group of countries, although with some variation. Iraq, prior to the disruptions of 1991, ranked well above the mean on several indicators; current information is lacking. Life expectancy for the group averages only 53 years, and infant mortality rates average more than 100; for 10 countries the IMRs are above 100. The average rate of adult literacy is 50 percent (far below Berelson's threshold of 70 percent expected with a crude birth rate of 35). Primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios average only 50 percent. The labor force is primarily agricultural, and income per capita is low, below the threshold associated with CBRs of 35.
Proximate Determinants and Pace of Change
The four prospect groups of countries differ systematically in terms of proximate determinants. Partial information is presented here on their patterns for marriage, contraceptive use, induced abortion, and breastfeeding.
Marriage
The average values for proportions of women married at ages 15-19 and 20-24 for the four prospect groups are as follows: The differences across the four groups are great, and the pattern is the expected one: At ages 15-19, one-third of women are already married in the countries in the Unlikely group, but less than one-tenth are married in the countries in the Certain group. At ages 20-24, the range is 43 to 73 percent, a span of 30 points. The Certain countries tend to be the more modernized ones, with later marriage associated with higher education, greater urbanization, and other factors. Where smaller proportions of women are married at ages 15-19, the total fertility rate is reduced, an effect attenuated somewhat where out-of-wedlock births occur among teenagers. The proportion of women married at ages 20-24 has changed during modernization, dramatically in some cases. For example, in South Korea, 95 percent were married in 1940, but only 50 percent were in 1960, and 28 percent were in 1985. Now, at ages 15-19, only 1 to 4 percent are married in China, Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.
Contraceptive Use
The four prospect groups differ even more in levels of contraceptive use than in proportions married-from 10 to 71 percent in 1990, as has been shown in Table 3 and Figure 1 . The four groups can also be compared in their past pace of change, at least for 21 of the 37 countries considered: six of the eight Certain countries, eight of the thirteen Probable countries, two of the five Possible countries, and five of the eleven Unlikely countries. The time periods covered vary from 8.5 to 25 years; all but two are for more than 10 years, and almost half are for 20 or more years. On average, contraceptive prevalence (CPR) in the 21 countries rose by 1.8 points per year, over a mean period of about 16 years-a total change of about 28 points, with each country given equal weight. When weighted by females aged 15-49 the results are: The most rapid rises in CPR occurred in Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan, at 2.5 to 2.9 points per year. In North Africa, Morocco's contraceptive prevalence rose by 1.8 percentage points, and Egypt's by 1.4 percentage points; in subSaharan Africa, Kenya's rose by 1.8 percentage points.
Induced Abortion
Although data are lacking on the frequency of induced abortion in most of these countries, they can at least be compared in terms of abortion availability. The measure here, based upon assessments by country informants (Mauldin and Ross, 1991: 365) , is the proportion of the population having "ready and easy access to abortion services, whether or not abortions are legal," with exclusions where abortions are carried out under unsafe conditions. The resulting averages are: Breastfeeding National surveys, many of them sponsored by the Demographic and Health Surveys organization, provide data on breastfeeding behavior. Of the 37 countries, only 9-11 are covered by these surveys, depending upon the variable in question. This partial information can be seen in Table 6 .
The pattern is clear despite the small numbers of observations: that is, one of longer breastfeeding in the groups with higher fertility prospects. All of the Certain and Probable countries here are in Asia and Latin America (plus Morocco); the rest are entirely in sub-Saharan Africa.
Change in SES and TFR
In addition to the four proximate determinants, the pace of historical change in the SES indicator and in the total fertility rate can be examined. The socioeconomic indicator is scored in such a way that, theoretically, countries can rank from zero to 100, although in fact, neither extreme is reached. For 1960, the lowest value was 5 for On average, the total fertility rate in these 37 countries fell by 1.72 births per woman during the 25-year period from 1960-65 to 1985-90 (when weighted by population size, the average decrease is 2.23 over the period). As expected, the four prospect groups differed greatly in their pace of change.
Average years for decrease of one child in TFR 
Comparison of Total Fertility Rate Projections
We have extrapolated the past TFR trend for each country by a curvilinear formula,3 toward an arbitrary floor of 1.7 (since a straight linear extrapolation to 2015 carries some countries to very low levels, even to below zero). This extrapolation produces a low 2015 figure for countries with past TFR declines, and a high figure for countries with a high and essentially unchanged TFR in the past. The United Nations, the World Bank, and the Bureau of the Census have all published a TFR trend for the period 1960-65 through 1985-90 , and all three project future TFR levels. These projections differ little, and they all assume that many countries with high fertility will initiate declines sometime in the present decade. For illustrative purposes, we compare the United Nations figures to our extrapolation of past trends in Table 7 . Figure 2 shows the four extrapolations, Figure 3 the contrasting projections for the Certain andUnlikely groups, and Figure 4 the contrasts for the Possible andProbable groups.
In the Certain group, differences between the two projections are small. The United Nations figures are regularly higher, but by small amounts; in the Probable group, the differences are also minor and are mixed in sign. The picture changes considerably for the other two groups, as a result of the assumption made by the United Nations (as well as the other two agencies) that a noticeable fertility decline will begin during the 1990s. In the Possible group, the United Nations averages 1.49 points lower than the last extrapolation, and in the Unlikely group, 2.43 points lower. Incidentally, there is greater consensus that high fertility cannot continue indefinitely than there is agreement as to when each decline will begin: the United Nations, the World Bank, and the Bureau of the Census differ in the timing for individual countries.
By the extrapolation of past trends, the four prospect groups differ systematically in the number of countries that will reach replacement fertility: All of the Certain countries make it, and, with a TFR cutoff of 2.2, four of the 13 Probable group countries do so (or six nearly do so if the cutoff is a TFR of 2.3, instead of 2.2). The UN projections show all of the Certain and five of the Probable group at a TFR of 2.2 or less (eleven at 2.3 or less). Clearly, for all of the Probable group to reach replacement fertility by 2015, some of them must accelerate beyond their pace of fertility decline. None of the Possible or Unlikely countries reaches replacement fertility in either set of figures.
Notably, six countries had already lowered their total fertility rates to 2.5 or below by the end of 1992: China, The extrapolation of past trends does not give any indication that fertility will begin to fall in the Unlikely group in this decade. However, there have been appreciable changes in socioeconomic factors during the past three decades, and if fertility is projected according to the projected changes in socioeconomic factors, the average TFR in 2015 for this group of countries would decline from 6.75 in 1985-90 to 4.31 in 2015, a slightly higher Figure 4 Projected average total fertility rates for 18 developing countries, possible and probable prospect groups, according to extrapolation of past trends and United Nations projections rica have experienced severe civil and economic disruptions, which may well confound future projections. As noted earlier, the ranking of countries on the composite index is robust against changes in our assumptions, and it agrees well with what general observation of the countries suggests. However, what may be termed our "level of confidence" is, of course, lower for some countries than for others. In particular, fertility in the two large countries of China and Indonesia is subject to the strong national programs there, and if policies or implementation were to weaken and services to diminish, the downward trend of the TFR could soften or reverse. Similarly, certain countries with apparently poor prospects could conceivably establish strong information and service programs and experience faster fertility decline than now seems likely.
Conclusion
The four groups of countries identified here differ sharply in all fertility-related indicators. The likelihood that anything near replacement fertility will be attained during the foreseeable future varies across a wide range, from certainty to apparent impossibility. In every case, population growth will continue for many years; in the worst cases, no time boundary whatever can be set.
For each of the indicators, the data are more favorable for the Certain group than for the Probable group, more favorable for the Probable than the Possible, and more favorable for the Possible than the Unlikely. The data for the Unlikely group are uniformly depressing-high mortality, low income, low contraceptive prevalence, weak family planning program effort, and high fertility with little indication of change. However, for that group from 1965 to 1990, life expectancy increased by 10 years; infant mortality decreased by one-third; adult literacy tripled from the low of 15 percent to 45 percent, still low; primary plus secondary school enrollment ratios increased from 25 percent to 45 percent; income grew at an average rate of 3.1 percent per year (from 1965 to 1985) ; and the urban population increased from 17.5 to 28.5 percent. Those indicators remain at a low level, but if they change as much in the future as they did from 1965 to 1985-90, by 2010 those countries will rank a little higher than the Possible group did in 1985. Before 2010, and possibly in this decade, as the UN, the World Bank, and the US Bureau of the Census assume, fertility in those countries probably will have begun to decline, and is likely to be below 5.0 by 2015.
While each of the indicators favors the Possible group more than the Unlikely group, none is at a desired level. Average life expectancy in the Possible group is only 57 years, fertility has fallen by only 1.4 children per woman in 25 years (to a TFR of 5.7), and the rate of natural increase is 2.8 percent, which would double the population in 25 years. Contraceptive prevalence is low, and the family planning program effort score is at the midway point, 49. However, prospects for the Possible group, based on an extrapolation of past changes in socioeconomic indicators, are for more rapid fertility change than that experienced in the past two and a half decades. Vigorous and voluntary family planning programs could greatly accelerate the rate of fertility decline and slow population growth.
Finally, however favorable the TFR projections are for some countries, prospects are diminished when population momentum (age structure) is considered. Even if fertility could magically be lowered immediately to the replacement level, the population of developing countries would continue its growth for decades, and increase by about three billion persons before it levels off.
Appendix I Thresholds
Berelson hypothesized that in order for fertility to decline to a specified level, certain levels of socioeconomic factors had to be reached; he called these "thresholds," and assigned values as follows: He commented that "Exact precision in this regard is not possible, warranted, or needed, and even the analysts of thresholds consider them tentative, preliminary, questionable. I do not take these thresholds literally, in the sense that only these value of only these variables will do the trick, but rather as rough indicators of a socioeconomic setting congenial to fertility reduction-markers, or surrogates, if not controlling in their own right." (Berelson, 1978: 582) Appendix II
Creation of the Socioeconomic Indicator
The socioeconomic indicator for each country is composed of seven items: life expectancy, infant mortality rate, percentage of males employed in nonagricultural jobs, GNP per capita, percentage of the population living in an urban area, percentage of literate adults, and percentage of school-aged children enrolled in primary and secondary school. Data appear in Table 5 . The first step toward the creation of the SES indicator was to recode a country's value for each item according to where it falls along the range of observed values. Each country's values are placed onto a scale of zero to 100, where zero is defined as the lowest observed value for the item in any of the three time periods (1960, 1985, and 2010) ; and 100 is defined as the highest observed value.
For all indicators except infant mortality rate, this is done according to the following model:
Country's valueminimum observed value xlOO Range of observed values For the infant mortality rate, a reversal is needed, because low values rather than high ones are desirable. Thus, to invert the scale, the numerator is the maximum value minus the observed value.
The second and final step toward the creation of the socioeconomic indicator is to compute the average of the scaled values for the seven items. For missing data, the average of available items is used; however, in relatively few cases are data missing.
Sources and assumptions for the individual items are as follows:
Life expectancy: UN medium variant projections; Sta- Because of the large size of their populations, China and India exert great influence over any populationweighted average of the SES indicator. Inasmuch as the SES values for China and India are low compared with those of the other countries in their respective categories, the averages for these categories appear low. Table  Al shows two variations that highlight this point. The first, which was shown in the text, weights scores for each country equally. The second includes scores for each category weighted by the UN medium variant population size for each time period. 
